An unlevel playing field?

Very little is known about the funding of Namibia’s political parties. The existing Electoral Act only has one section that deals with party funding (Article 46), which says that foreign funding should not be received unless it is publicly disclosed. Unfortunately, the Act does not specify how this should be done. As a result, even though the Act sets out penalties for not disclosing foreign funding, it is effectively unenforceable.
Until 1997, all of Namibia’s political parties were privately funded. However, after calls for state support to ensure the future viability of parties, a funding mechanism was introduced in 1997. Again there was a lack of legal clarity about the system – which is based on a 1996 Cabinet decision rather than a piece of legislation. The amount to be shared among political parties in a financial year is 0.2 percent of the revenue from the previous financial year, which is divided among the parties represented in the National Assembly according to the number of seats. The parties face no legal requirements to account for the money they receive and in terms of accountability the money effectively disappears into a void. The amounts are not insignificant. Since 1997 it is estimated that N$190 million has been given to political parties.
The system as it is faces several fundamental criticisms. Firstly, it lacks transparency. No one, except the parties, knows what happens to the money once it is handed by the National Assembly. Secondly, it heavily favours the dominant party with smaller parties complaining that they are left to pick up the scraps. Thirdly, parties outside parliament complain that they have no access to state funds.
There is a counter argument which says that parties that have little support at the ballot box do not deserve to have large wedges of public funding. Smaller parties tend to argue that they find themselves in a vicious circle: that a lack of funding limits their campaigning and hence they can never gain the number of seats that would produce significant funding.
There are those who believe that state funding of parties is a waste of taxpayers’ money. They argue that parties should be self-financing primarily through membership subscriptions and donations. However, it can also be argued that transparent state funding of parties helps to prevent corruption by ensuring that parties are not mainly dependent on donations from businesses seeking favours if that parties gains power. In addition, state funding also makes it less likely for a party to become dependent on foreign funding.
Internationally, there is no standard blueprint for state funding of parties. Many countries do not fund parties, while others use a variety of different systems. Botswana, Zambia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Madagascar, Tanzania and Mauritius do not use public money to fund parties. Other countries, such as Zimbabwe, are similar to Namibia – in that they allocate funds according to the proportion of seats in the lower chamber of parliament. Some, such as Malawi, only give funds to parties that passed a threshold (10 percent) of support in the previous election. While there is little regional convergence on this issue, the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections do state that the funding of political parties has to be transparent.
In South Africa, parties in the National Assembly and provincial legislatures are financed by the state through the Public Funding of Represented Parties Act (1997). The process of funding the parties and way the parties spend the money is overseen by the Independent Electoral Commission. The parties may use the funds for any purpose "compatible with its functioning as a political party in a modern democracy”. The Auditor General later audits the accounts and reports back to parliament. Ninety percent of the funding available is divided among the parties based on the number of seats they have in the national and provincial legislatures. However, 10 percent is shared equally among parties represented at provincial level in a bid to assist smaller parties. The main complaint about party funding in South Africa is that private donations are not regulated.
Increasingly models for state funding of parties tend to include smaller parties in an attempt to strengthen plurality and give voters a range of viable choices at election time. In Lesotho, half of the allotted funds are divided equally among the parties and half is divided according the number of candidates a party fielded at the previous election. This system rewards parties that have a national profile, even if they do not have large numbers of MPs.
The reform of the Electoral Act (with an amendment bill due before parliament this year) created an opportunity to end the secrecy over party funding and to look at introducing a fairer system. Unfortunately, the amendment bill that is currently available in draft form fails to tackle the issue of party funding. In fact, it leaves Article 46, which is clearly unworkable, intact. This tends to indicate that the suggested changes to the legislation are piecemeal in nature, rather than an attempt to comprehensively overhaul the Act to ensure it is an effective and meaningful piece of legislation.
Funding parties should not be seen simply as a drain on taxpayers’ pockets. Rather, a well-devised and regulated party funding system could further entrench democracy and accountability in Namibia. State funding could be used as a lever to ensure that parties’ finances are transparently and accountably spent; that parties genuinely have paid-up party memberships; and that parties develop research and policy-making activities (see Blueprint for Namibia box).
For more information on funding of political parties see:

Electoral Institute of Southern Africa
http://www.eisa.org.za

International IDEA
http://www.idea.int

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